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which an unauthorized signer is personally liable on his signature
to any person who takes the instrument in good faith. As stated it
is not intended to effect criminal liability for forgery or any other
33
crime or civil liability to the drawer or to any other person.
With reference to the recent amendment to the Minnesota
NIL, it is stated in the annotation that the extension of the
bearer paper concept promotes expediting and safety in circulation
of negotiable instruments.14 The proposed changes of the UCC do
not further extend this theory but effect even more desirable results
by abrogating the theory completely. Section 3-405 does this by
requiring indorsement no matter by whom made.
Applying §3-405 to the hypothetical case presented earlier,
the result would seem to place the loss on the corporation on
whom it rightfully belongs. If adopted, this same section would
in all likelihood prevent much litigation, not benefiting the lawyer
directly but the community as a whole. 3 Ezekiel would be happy
to see his prophecy come true, if only in this one small phase of the
law.36
FRANCIS BREIDENBACH.

TRIAL -

INSTRUCTIoNS TO JURy -

INSTRUcTIoNs BEFORE ARGU-

MENT. - Although the purpose of the instruction by the court to
the jury has been defined in a multitude of ways, it may be said,
in general, that its purpose is to inform the jury as to the law of
the case as it applies to the facts in such a manner that the jury is
not misled.' In order that this might best be accomplished the
practice was adopted at common law of giving the instructions after
the argument of counsel and immediately preceding the retiring of
the jury.2 The reasoning assigned as afixing this time for giving the
instructions was that after argument of counsel had pulled the jurors
hiteher and yon the judge had the final word to see that they retired
with a clear, unbiased and unemotional statement of the facts and
the applicable law fresh in their minds. A further reason was that
33. U.C.C. § 3-405 (comment 5).
34. See Minn. Stat. § 335.052 (3) (1945).
35. See 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 281, 289 (1951).
36. See Prophecy of Ezekiel c. 18, v. 20: "The soul that sins the same shall die. The
son shall not bear the sins of the father, the father shall not bear the sins of the son. The
justice of the just shall be upon him. The wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him."
1. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Nicholson, 9 F.2d 7
(1925).
2. Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials § 443 (1950).
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in England the judge had the right to sum up and comment upon
the evidence in the case.3 Though this practice flourished at common law many states, by statute, changed the time of giving instructions so that it came at the close of the evidence and before
argument. Thus by 1894 it was reported that instructions were
usually given before counsel entered upon the argument of the
case. 4 Among the reasons for this change was the tendency of the
various states to limit the power of the judiciary to sum up and
comment upon the evidence.
PRACTICE IN THE VARIOUS STATES

A study of the various states indicates the varying practices
that are followed. At least fifteen states specifically provide by
statute that the giving of instructions shall precede the argument
of counsel.5 At least ten states provide, on the other hand, that the
instructions shall come after argument of counsel. ° To each of these
lists can be added a number of states whose case law has indicated
a definite time at which instructions shall be given. Thus Kentucky,- Maryland,8 and Mississippi9 can be apparently added to
3. Diamond, Instructions to Jury 1 (1946).
4. Fitnam, Trial Procedure § 629 (1894).
5. Arkansas; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2134 (1947).
Arizona; Ariz. Code Ann.
21-1021 (1939).
Colorado; Comp. Laws Colo. § 7104 (1921).
Idaho; Idaho Code Ann. § 7-206 (1932).
Kansas; Kansas Gen. Stat. § 60-2909 (1949) (Instructions after argument previous
to 1881).
Michigan; Comp. Laws Mich. § 691.432 (1948).
Missouri; Mo. Rev. Stat. J 546.070 (Supp. 1945).
Montana; Mont. Rev. Code § 9349 (1935).
New Mexico; New Mex. Stat. § 19-101 (51) (c) (1941). (Prior to 1935 instructions
were after argument in criminal cases).
Oklahoma; Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 577 (1951).
South Dakota; S. D. Code § 33.1307 (1939).
Texas; Tex. Stat. Rule 275, Rules of Civil Procedure (Vernon, 1948).
Utah; Utah Code, Rule 51, Rules of Civil Procedure (1953).
West Virginia; W. Va. Code, Rule 6, Rules of Practice for Trial Courts (1949).
Wyoming; Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-2408 (1945).
6. California; Calif. Code of Civil Procedure § 607 (Deering, 1953).
Florida; Fla. Stat.§ 918.10 (1951).
Indiana; Ind. Stat. Ann. § 584 (Burn's, 1926).
Iowa; Iowa Code Ann. Rule 196, Rules of Civil Procedure (1951).
Minnesota; Minn. Stat. § 546.14 (1945).
Nevada; Rev. Laws of Nev. § 5210 (1912).
New York; N. Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 388 (1953).
North Dakota; N. D. Rev. Code § 28-1410 (1943).,
Ohio; Ohio Gen. Code Ann. § 11447 (Page, 1926).
Oregon; Ore. Code Ann. § 2-301 (1930).
7. Whittaker v. Comm. 188 Ky. 95, 221 S.W. 215 (1920); Paducah Traction Co. v.
Sine, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 792, 111 S.W. 356 (1908) "The giving of an additional instruction
after argument . . . was not error . . .- where it appeared that such instruction was indis-

pensable."
8. Weant v. Southern Trust and Deposit Co., 112 Md. 463, 77 At. 289 (1910) "An
instruction after argument of the case . . . in view of what had been said in argument ...
was not error." See Soper, The Charge to the jury in Marjland Under the New Rules of
Practice and Procedure, 6 Md. L. Rev. 35 (1941).
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those giving instructions before argument, while Louisiana, 0 North
Carolina, 1 Pennsylvania 12 and Vermont 3 seemingly follow the
practice of instructing after argument of counsel. At least one state
provides for the giving of requested instructions before argument
and the general charge after the arguments' 4 A considerable
number of states do not provide for any specific time for the giving
of instructions. In such a case the state may follow the common law
rule as to the time for instructions or may allow the various courts
of the state to set their own rules as to trial procedure. 1
INTERPRETATION OF THE

RULEs

While it has been held that the court may not vary from the
time fixed by statute as to the giving of instructions," the general
rule is that such a departure is not reversible error providing no
prejudice results to the parties, or where justice demands it.'! Thus
where it is provided that instructions shall be given before argument such regulation has been held not to prevent the giving of
additional instructions after argument.' 8 In Missouri instructions
9. Maxey v. State, 140 Miss. 570, 106 So. 353 (1925) (after the argument in the case
has opened it is error to give an instruction without stopping the case and giving the opposite
party a chance to comment thereon); Montgomery v. State, 85 Miss. 330, 37 So. 835 (1905)
(Instructions after argument has commenced should be given in only rare occasions.).
10. State v. Williams, 192 La. 713, 189 112 So. (1939) "After argument of counsel
judge should give instructions immediately
11. State v. Morgan, 225 N.C. 549, 35 S.E.2d 621 (1945) (Requests for special instructions must be in before the beginning of argument).
12. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 678 (Purdon's, 1953) "If any of the parties shall request
the court to charge the jury . . . such charge shall be drawn up and handed to the court
before argument . .. and the judge . . . shall read them . . . before they retire."

13. Belock v. State Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 108 Vt. 252, 185 Atl. 100 (1936) (Instructions
are given after all evidence and arguments of counsel).
14. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1107 (1943).
15. Kelly v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 275 Ill.
App. 112 (1934) (Circuit court could
relax its own rule so as to allow the handing of instructions to the judge at a later time
than- the rules provided); State v. Cobbs, 40 W.Va. 718, 22 S.E. 310 (1895) (When the
state does not fix any time for instruction the court may fix it by rule).
16. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Shober, 38 Ohio App. 216, 176 N.E. 88 (1931) (Provisions
of statutes as to giving instructions to jury before argument are mandatory); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Kroger, 114 Ohio St. 303, 151 N.E. 127 (1926); International and G.N. By. Co.
v. Parke, 169 S.W. 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (The statutes which require the court- to
prepare and read its charge to the jury before argument are mandatory); Foster v. Turner, 31
Kan. 58, 1 Pac. 145 (1883) (Court can instruct after argument only in answer to comment
made by counsel in his argument).
17. Sams v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 157 Kan. 278, 139 P.2d 859 (1943)
(Notwithstanding the requirement to instruct before argument, such argument and other
things may sometimes justify instructions afterward, but such instructions should not go
beyond what is fairly authorized by the argument of counsel or some other good reason).
18. Crain v. St. Louis, San Francisco By. Co., 206 Ark. 465, 176 S.W.2d (1944) (Although statute directs that instructions shall be given prior to argument, trial court may
for sufficient reasons give instructions after argument); Jones v. Stanley, 27 Ariz. 381, 233
Pac. 598 (1925) (giving of instructions after argument, contrary to statute is not prejudicial);
Paducah Traction Co. v. Sine, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 792, 111 S.W. 356 (1908) (The giving of
additional instructions after argument was

not error where it appeared such instructions

were indispensable); Cluskey v. City of St. Louis, 50 Mo. 89 (1872) (Instruction after
argument, although irregular is no ground for reversal); Rhea v. Territory, 3 Okla. Cr. 230,
105 Pac. 314 (1909) (judge has discretion to give additional instructions before jury
retires).
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have been upheld which were given after the plaintiff's argument
and before that of the defendant despite a statute providing for
instructions before argument.1" California provides by statute that,
for good reason, the order of trial may be departed from. 20 The
Supreme Court of Idaho has held that a departure from the prescribed order of trial is not reversible error in absence of timely
objections.21 Washington has upheld instructions given after the
defendant's closing argument and before the plaintiff's."2 The
giving of such instructions after argument and contrary to the
customary procedure must usually be for the purpose of correcting
or qualifying statements made by counsel during argument or to
cure a misconduct of counsel therein."a
Likewise it has been held that a provision that instructions
shall be given after argument 4does not forbid the giving of specific
2
instructions before argument.
In North Dakota the statutory order of trial prescribes that
instructions shall be given after the argument of counsel.25 This
section further provides the trial must proceed in the prescribed
order, unless the judge for special reasons directs otherwise. North
Dakota has allowed such a departure by permitting instructions to
be given before argument of counsel, and the practice was upheld
on appeal, although upon the ground that no objection was made
at the time. 2r Other cases have permitted a departure from the
prescribed order of trial.27 Although this indicates that the order of
trial is clearly not mandatory, the fact remains that in only the
barest minimum of cases will there be such a departure. In view of
the fact that both South Dakota and Montana charge the jury
before argument and of the growth in that direction, a summary of
possible arguments for and against a possible change seems
indicated.
ARGUMENTS FOR THE CHANGE

The practice of requiring the attorney to argue the case before
the instructions have been made known is a most difficult one from
19. Proctor v. Home Trust Co., 221 Mo. App. 577, 284 S.W. 156 (1926); Dyer v.
Griffith, 261 S.W. 100 (Mo. App. 1924) (error to give an instruction for plaintiff after
opening argument for plaintiff had been made).
20. Cal. Penal Code § 1094 (Deering 1949).
21. Schmidt v. Wilson, 34 Idaho 723, 203 Pac. 1075 (1921).
22. Kuhnhausen v. Woodbeck, 2 Wash.2d 338, 97 P.2d 1099 (1940).
23. Weant v. Southern Trust & Deposit Co., 112 Md. 463, 77 Atl. 289 (1910); Yore
v. Mueller Coal, Heavy Hauling & Transfer Co., 147 Mo. 679, 49 S.W. 855 (1899).
24. Zimmerman v. Second Nat. Bank, 24 Ohio App. 48, 156 N.E. 157 (1926).
25. N.D. Rev. Code § 28-1410 (1943).
26. Bormann v. Beckman, 73 N.D. 720, 19 N.W.2d 455 (1945).
27. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. Von Bank, 72 N.D. 497, 8 N.W.2d 599 (1943).
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his position. Since the lawyer, in such argument, must base his
plea on legal principles it is of paramount importance that he know
what those legal principles are. He is required to make a difficult
choice. He can argue the case based on wht he thinks the judge
will charge and run the risk of correction by the court. Or he can
play safe and omit any controversial points in his argument with the
result that his argument is thereby weakened and made less effffective. It is unfair to the advocate to require him to say to the jury
"The judge will probably charge you thus and so." He is entitled
to know what those instructions will be. With such knowledge the
trial lawyer has an infinitely better chance of making an effective
argument. His charge can be based on certainty as to the instructions instead of mere speculation. The aid which such knowledge
provides is of inestimable value in his preparation for such charge.
A change to giving the instructions before argument will aid
not only counsel, but substantial benefits will inure to the jury as
well.
After the evidence is all in the jury needs a disinterested party
to point out the gist of the controversy, to arrange it in a systematic, and orderly fashion, and to point out and charge them as to
the principles of law by which those facts must be governed. Thus
the jury will be in a far better position to follow the arguments of
counsel more intelligently and to weigh them in the light of the
applicable principles of law which have already been given. It is
also better that the jury go into the jury room with the arguments
of counsel fresh in their minds rather than a charge on abstract
principles of law. This is for the reason that they thus retain the
atmosphere of the controversy. The jury system is thus given
greater vitality through depriving the judge of his ability to influence the decision through a possible "slanted" charge which cannot be dealt with by counsel. Too often, when the charge is given
last, the jury is lulled into an atmosphere of complacency by a long
charge on abstract principles of law and find that on their retirement they must restore themselves to the mood of the controversy.
It is better that the jury retire with the final impact of the argument
rather than the charge of the court.
Such a change would also work substantial benefits to the
judge. To start with, once the evidence is all in, the logical time arrives when all concerned need to know the law which applies to
the controversy. Later arguments of counsel are of no concern to
the judge unless they are in some manner irregular. The judge has
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the opportunity of having his attention called to possible errors by
counsel before argument so that they may be corrected before the
argument is beard. The judge also has the advantage of correcting
any possible errors or supplementing his instructions after argument
has concluded. Thus a double check exists to insure that the instructions are not only correct but also complete.
Since it is of great advantage for the jury to have the instructions in written form on their retirement, this system allows time for
typing up the charge during argument so that copies are available
"-'s
to the jury immediately on their retirement.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CHANGE

The argument against changing the age-old, common law
rule of giving the charge last is substantially as follows: It would
involve a radical change, something that law has always abhorred.
It is most important that the jury retire in an unbiased frame of
mind since on them, once they retire, rests the whole burden of
judging the right and wrong of the case. Therefore .the last words
they hear before retiring should be dispassionate and nonpartisan.
The last thing that is desired is an inflamed jury, stirred up by the
argument of the advocate of great oratorical and emotional appeal
which may easily lead them to decide the case on emotional considerations having no relation to the legal merits of the case. Allowing counsel to argue after the instruction gives undue advantage to
the lawyer of unusual oratorical ability, and even in case such
ability is equal the advocate who argues last has the advantage.
The greater the oratorical skill of counsel the more necessary is
the position of the judge to instruct after argument so that the jury
may be restored to a calm and considered state of mind.
The argument that the jury system would be strengthened by
allowing counsel a chance to counter a "slanted" charge is entirely
fallacious. To the extent that the control of the court over the
proceedings is lessened, the control of partisan counsel is increased,
and with it an increased danger of a miscarriage of justice.
The judge has the greater advantages under the present system.
He speaks last and therefore has the benefit of everything that has
been previously said. He can correct, within the limits of his authority, any mistakes of counsel. It is not necessary for him to "correct"
28. These arguments are gathered from a number of sources, the principal ones being:
Blatt, Judge's Charge to Jury Should Precede,Arguments of Counsel, 33 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y.
56 (1949); 6 Md. L. Rev. 35, 46 (1941); Busch, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials
§ 443 (1950).
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mistakes of his own in his first charge since in speaking last he
can give the correct charge so that no confusion results to the jury.
The present system results in no real inconvenience or disadvantage to the advocate. In the vast majority of cases the law is
not seriously controverted; the decision will turn largely on the
facts. Counsel thus has little danger of being corrected by the
judge. Experienced counsel can easily anticipate what the judge
will charge in a given situation. Inexperienced advocates can find
out easily by a small amount of research. Thus there is no advantage to having the charge precede argument.
As to the infrequent situations when an involved principle of
law arises the judge is frequently allowed, in his discretion, to give
a preliminary instruction on it before argument of counsel."0
THE FEDERAL PRACTICE

Both the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure
declare that. the court shall instruct after the .arguments are completed. 30 The rule, however, goes on to state that counsel may
submit written requests for- instructions at the close of the evidence
or at any 'previous time, and the court shall inform counsel of its
proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the
jury. It has been held that if the court, in its charge, includes
matter contained in a rejected request for instructions counsel may
call the attention of the court to this and request the right to
argue that matter to the jury.31
The purpose of the rule thus is to permit counsel to be informed as to which of his requested instructions will be given so
that he can argue with the knowledge that certain of his requests
will be given. Insofar as this is accomplished the purpose is commendable. However it can be immediately seen that this goes only
part way, in that counsel is still uninformed as to instructions requested by his opponent and other general charges by the court
itself. However it does have the laudable advantage of allowing
counsel to submit requests on all the possible points of doubt so
that, after the court rules on these requests, he may judge what
the court will charge on the points of law involved.
Several states have adopted rules of procedure somewhat
29. Again these arguments are gathered from a number of sources of which the leading
are: Hartshorne, The Timing of the Charge to the jury, 33 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y. 90 (1949);
6 Md. L. Rev. 35, 46 (1941).
30. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51; Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 30.
31. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis v. Staengel, 122 F.2d 271 (1941).
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similar to the Federal practice. Minnesota provides for the granting or refusal of requests before argument and allows counsel to
read the approved requests to the jury in their argument. 1 2 The
charge then comes at the conclusion of the argument. The purpose
of this provision is to enable litigants to have the applicable principles of law discussed by counsel in their final argument." The
benefit to litigants of having such applicable principles of law discussed by counsel in final argument is not to be underestimated."
Florida has a statute similar in effect to Minnesota.33 Statutes in
Ohio and Wyoming require the giving of requested instructions
before argument and the general charge after." Ithas there been
held that such requested instructions must be given before argument and the defect cannot be cured by giving them in the general
7
charge after argument.It would seem that there is considerable to be said for the
argument that counsel has a right either to have the instructions
givern before argument or to know what the instructions will be
when given. The argument that the last voice the jury is to hear
before retiring should be that of the judge calmly restoring them to
the main elements of the controversy and the law which they are
to use as a guide to their verdict, is likewise of great force. While
these two statements seem beyond reconciliation it is to be noted
that it is not impossible to combine much of the better arguments
on either side into a single, workable rule.
ROBERT H. LUNDBERG.
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EFFECT OF ERROR BY

One of the most difficult problems faced by
the law arises when one of two innocent parties must bear a loss
occasioned by the act of a third party. This situation is presented to
a court when a party acquiring an interest in property presents his
instrument of title to a recording officer and receives it back believing in good faith that it has been recorded in compliance with
the law only to discover later that as the result of an error by the
recording officer another party has acquired an interest in the same
property without having been able reasonably to discover the interRECORDING OFFICER.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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Minn. Stat. § 546.14 (1945).
Lataurelle v. Horan, 212 Minn. 520, 4 N.W.2d 343 (1942).
Zickrick v. Strathern, 211 Minn. 329, 1 N.W.2d 134 (1941).
Fla. Stat. § 918.10 (1951).
Ohio Gen. Code § 11447 (Page's, 1926); Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-2408 (1945).
Industrial Comm. v. Austin, 51 Ohio App. 469, 1 N.E.2d 649 (1935).

